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Alain Locke, "Harlem: Dark Weather-Vane," Survey Graphic 25.8 (August 1936): 457.
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- 1 2023-07-08T16:36:50+00:00 Anonymous Locke, Alain. "Harlem: Dark Weather-Vane," Survey Graphic 25, 8 (August 1936): 457-62, 493-95. Anonymous 7 plain 2024-01-11T22:21:37+00:00 Anonymous
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2023-07-02T17:40:42+00:00
Releasing the MCCH report
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2024-02-23T22:25:23+00:00
MCCH members present when Mayor La Guardia spoke to journalists after their meeting on July 1st apparently said nothing. Nonetheless the New York Post reported that they “appeared to be satisfied with progress reported by the Mayor." Later, one of the MCCH members told a journalist from the New York Herald Tribune “that the committee is generally pleased with the results of the conference and is willing to let the Mayor make the final report public when the addenda from various department heads are sent to him.” On a similar note, Charles Roberts told the New York Amsterdam News that he was “convinced that the mayor is sincerely working to carry out the recommendations of the commission.”
However they felt about the city’s response to their recommendations, a willingness to let the mayor release their report at some unspecified time in the future seemed unlikely to be shared by all the MCCH members given how strongly they felt about its importance. To the contrary, at least some appear to have responded differently soon after the meeting. “The Commission’s report to the Mayor is OUR report and not the Mayor’s. And it is our report whether he likes it or not,” Rev. Robinson told the Daily Worker. Then the Daily Worker obtained a copy of the report and started publishing chapters on July 2. On July 18, the New York Amsterdam News obtained and published the entire report other than the foreword and letter to the mayor that accompanied it. While the New York Age claimed the mayor had given its competitor the document, that seems unlikely given that the text published by both newspapers was not the version submitted to him, but Frazier’s unedited text. The New York Amsterdam News certainly did not credit the mayor as the source. “The Amsterdam News is happy it could avail itself of the opportunity to present to the public for the first time the complete report of the MCCH,” the paper editorialized. “Our duty appeared more patent because Mayor La Guardia has kept it hidden for months.” It also played up that the recommendations it published were “considered too hot, too caustic, too critical, too unfavorable by the Mayor,” and had been changed in the final version. Given that it was Frazier’s text that was supplied to the newspaper, it would not have come from an MCCH member who had pushed for the changes in the submitted version. Eunice Carter might have been the source. She had spoken up for submitting Frazier’s report unedited and in favor of its immediate release during the MCCH meeting on February 14 and would have had a copy.
Introducing the report, the New York Amsterdam News published a story that summarized the discussion of the beginnings of the disorder while only identifying the topics of the other chapters, an attention to the events lacking in the white press. At the same time, it presented the report as nothing new, as “tell[ing] again of the combination of circumstances which made people to believe the young Negro boy had been beaten to death, and of how the police, first inefficiently, and next, ruthlessly, tried to meet the excitement of the people.” Both Frazier's assessments of the Communists' lack of responsibility for the disorder and their role in preventing it becoming a race riot were quoted in the story. Although the latter claim was new, and highlighted by a sub-heading “Communist Angle Touched,” the story offered no comment about it.
Publication in the New York Amsterdam News was not the official release that MCCH members sought. Not only was the report not the version they had submitted to the mayor, other newspapers did not publish stories about the content of the report and no copies were available to those who did not get editions of the New York Amsterdam News. “No newspapers will give the same publicity to something reprinted from another paper as they would to a story given the papers generally and at the same time,” the New York Age complained, effectively describing its own response. The effect, the New York Age editorial went on, was “to bury the report.” By La Guardia's account, the press response played out in exactly that way over the next three months. Journalists from several publications read the report but “none have seen fit to print anything about it” because all the news in it had been covered by the newspapers that had published it.
Alain Locke’s article, “Dark Weather-Vane,” published in the Survey Graphic in August 1936, did examine the report. Locked endorsed its account of the causes of the disorder, writing, “The careful report of the Commission on this occurrence correctly places the blame far beyond the immediate precipitating incidents.” More pointedly than in his memo to La Guardia, Locke criticized Valentine for continuing to assert that Communists caused the disorder. "There are those even in official circles who insist upon a more direct connection between Harlem’s restless temper and racial propaganda. To do so seriously misconstrues the situation by inverting the real cause and effect. Discrimination and injustice are the causes, not radicalism." Suggestions from Arthur Garfield Hays, who had been sent a draft of the article, had tightened the alignment of the article and the report. Where Locke had described the "immediate causes" of the disorder simply as "trivial," Hays suggested he add the "coincidental and unfortunate" events that the narratives in both the subcommittee report and Frazier's report presented as giving greater significance to the "trivial" apprehension of Lino Rivera: the appearances of the ambulance and the hearse. Locke revised the article to include that "by tragic coincidence an ambulance called to treat one of the Kress employees, whose hand the boy had bitten, seemed to confirm the rumor and a hearse left temporarily outside its garage in an alley at the rear of the store to corroborate this." Hays also suggested the addition of a "striking phrase" that the MCCH had used in regard to the killing of Lloyd Hobbs. Locke duly added the phrase: "As the report aptly says, 'A policeman who kills is prosecutor, judge and executioner.'" If Locke had been given a copy of the MCCH report, he would have realized that it did not actually contain that statement; it had appeared only in the report of the Subcommittee on Crime. Locke made no changes in response to Hays questioning how the article presented participation in the disorder. A reference to how as the result of Rivera's apprehension "a community of 200,000 was suddenly in the throes of serious riots through the night" wrongly gave the impression that "the whole community was engaged in rioting," Hays contended, when in fact the MCCH "concluded that 3 to 5 thousand was a liberal estimate." That more limited participation led the MCCH to often refer to "the incidents of that night as a disturbance rather than a riot," according to Hays. If Locke did not want to go as far as Hays in diminishing the violence of the disorder, which he described as "actual loss of life, many injures to police and citizens, destruction of property, and a serious aftermath of public grievance and anger," he did include other features of the MCCH's characterization of the events. In doing so, he drew on the Subcommittee Report as well as the MCCH report. After presenting the catalog of conclusions that opened the preliminary report, including that the events "were not a race riot in the sense of physical conflict between white and colored groups," he quoted Frazier's summation from the final report: "Its distinguishing feature was an attack upon property rather than persons." Rather than clearly endorsing that picture, in the opening of the article Locke offered a catalog of possible interpretations, noting that the events had been "variously diagnosed as a depression spasm, a Ghetto mutiny, a radical plot and dress rehearsal of proletarian revolution," before moving on to what concerned him, what the "revealing flash of lightning" showed: "the actual predicament of the mass life in Harlem." In glossing over the events in that way, he prefigured how historians would approach the disorder.
By September, two months after the meeting with the mayor, Oscar Villard's patience had run out. He and Hays called for a meeting of the MCCH “to decide once and for all whether it will issue its report now, or wait for the Mayor to release it when it is no longer of any value.” The meeting, of which there was no record, evidently decided to give La Guardia an ultimatum by telegram. If he did not release it within ten days, Villard wrote, they would release it themselves. Villard was out of touch with what had happened, the mayor responded; the report had been available to the press for ten weeks. After expressing his astonishment at that news to La Guardia, Villard promptly notified the New York Herald Tribune, New York Times, New York Sun, and New York World-Telegram that the report had been “released.” Notwithstanding La Guardia’s claim, New York Herald Tribune journalists appeared unaware until then that the report was available. However, when one called at the mayor's office to get a copy, there were none. La Guardia, clearly concerned to avoid again being accused of suppressing the report, scrambled to send a copy, together with the city commissioners’ responses, to the paper. The New York Herald Tribune published only the responses. Other newspapers must have also been sent that material at the same time, as similar stories appeared in the New York Post, New York American, Home News, and New York Amsterdam News. The New York Post was again alone in publishing a less credulous view of the city’s response, which it headlined "City Clears Itself." Charles Roberts sent an angry complaint to the mayor that the responses had been released without the report. Walter White of the NAACP initially shared that anger until Hubert Delany told him that New York Herald Tribune and New York Times had a copy of the report as well and had chosen not to include it (the New York Times also did not publish a story about the commissioner's responses). Valentine’s report received the least attention in the coverage of the commissioners' responses. The New York Herald Tribune and Home News quoted only the statements that the report was in error and that only the lawless resented police, and the New York American only mentioned his denial of any resentment (while the New York Amsterdam News story did not mention Valentine). None of the stories took up Valentine’s assertion that that Communists had caused the disorder.
As late as December, Eunice Carter was telling Morris Ernst that Mayor La Guardia was planning a meeting with the MCCH to discuss the report and to formally disband the group. The meeting never happened. Nor did the NAACP publish the report, as Carter suggested to Ernst they were planning to do. She might have misunderstood the organization's efforts to obtain copies of the report as an intention to publish it. In fact, the NAACP sought copies to give to individuals and organizations approaching it having struggled to find one. Arthur Garfield Hays also fielded similar requests, several times lending the copy in which he had marked sections for exclusion, the only one he had (given that this copy was not in his papers, one of those correspondents may have failed to return it). Frazier did submit proposals to publish the report to several presses. Although he pitched it as akin to the influential report on Chicago riot of 1919, he found no interest. It would not be until 1969 that the full report was published. That text was a transcription of the version that appeared in the New York Amsterdam News, establishing Frazier’s report, not the MCCH report as the version of record for most historians. Over time, writers and scholars relying on the report would follow Frazier and the MCCH members in marginalizing and obscuring the events of the disorder and diminishing its violence. -
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2023-09-04T23:59:55+00:00
The end of the Harlem Renaissance (1980s)
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2024-01-26T23:46:26+00:00
In the 1980s, the disorder in 1935 was given a place in the scholarship on the Harlem Renaissance. The conditions that produced the violence loomed larger in how the disorder was understood in those accounts than its framing as protest or the nature of the violence. Alain Locke had presented the disorder as the movement's end in his article "Harlem: Dark Weather-Vane" published in the Survey Graphic in 1936. Black leaders, as well as white leaders, shifted the focus of their energy to remedying social conditions in response to the violence. However, Nathan Irvin Huggins did not adopt that framing in his Harlem Renaissance, the foundational study published in 1971. The study that succeeded Huggins as the most widely read analysis of the artistic movement, When Harlem Was In Vogue by David Levering Lewis, did employ Locke's framing.
Alain Locke had nurtured the Harlem Renaissance, in the pages of the very same publication in which he wrote in 1936, so it was almost inevitable that he would frame the disorder in 1935 in terms of that movement. "Harlem: Dark Weather-Vane" presented the disorder as the "curtain raiser" to the "first scene of the next act—the prosy ordeal of the reformation with its stubborn tasks of economic reconstruction and social and civic reform." Its effect was "like a revealing flash of lightning it etched on the public mind another Harlem than the bright surface Harlem of the night clubs, cabaret tours and arty magazines." It "brought the first vivid realization of the actual predicament of the mass life of Harlem." To address this "dark Harlem of semi-starvation, mass exploitation and seething unrest" it was necessary for the neighborhood's elite to turn away from poetry and art, Locke argued. They had to end the Harlem Renaissance.
Although Nathan Irvin Huggins cited Locke’s article in the very first note in his book, he made no mention of the racial disorder in 1935. The Depression ended the Harlem Renaissance by his account: "When the decade of the 1930s opened, the innocent Harlem Renaissance ended." Economic depression soured the optimism of the renaissance generation. Huggins read Locke's 1936 article as showing that "even the most enthusiastic champion of the renaissance was sobered by the depression.”
David Levering Lewis too saw the depression as bringing an end to the Harlem Renaissance but positioned the disorder in 1935 as the end point in When Harlem Was In Vogue. He did so by dramatically ending his study with the disorder: "On the evening of March 19, 1935, the riot awaiting its immediate cause swept down Lenox Avenue with ten thousand angry Harlemites destroying two million dollars in white-owned commercial property," began the book's final paragraph. Relying on Claude McKay's article in the Nation and an article in Opportunity, two pillars of the Harlem Renaissance, he reported that "By the following morning, three Afro-Americans were dead, thirty people were hospitalized and more than one hundred in jail." Lewis offered few details of the disorder; he was not concerned to analyze the events. He wanted only to produce the "lightning-flash" that Locke had described. In the Preface to Penguin Books edition published in 1997, Lewis would less dramatically reiterate the place of the disorder. He demarcated three periods in the Harlem Renaissance, the last from "mid-1926 to the Harlem Riot of 1935.”
The riot as an end date would also later make its way into Huggins' book, albeit obliquely and outside his text. In Arnold Rampersad's foreword to a reissue of Harlem Renaissance published in 2007, he described 1935 as ”the outermost plausible mark” for the end of the movement without explanation. If the details of the disorder were still widely misunderstood, its role as a marker was established.