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• 1 2023-07-02T17:40:42+00:00 Releasing the MCCH report 76 plain 2024-02-23T22:25:23+00:00 MCCH members present when Mayor La Guardia spoke to journalists after their meeting on July 1st apparently said nothing. Nonetheless the New York Post reported that they “appeared to be satisfied with progress reported by the Mayor." Later, one of the MCCH members told a journalist from the New York Herald Tribune “that the committee is generally pleased with the results of the conference and is willing to let the Mayor make the final report public when the addenda from various department heads are sent to him.” On a similar note, Charles Roberts told the New York Amsterdam News that he was “convinced that the mayor is sincerely working to carry out the recommendations of the commission.”
  
  However they felt about the city’s response to their recommendations, a willingness to let the mayor release their report at some unspecified time in the future seemed unlikely to be shared by all the MCCH members given how strongly they felt about its importance. To the contrary, at least some appear to have responded differently soon after the meeting. “The Commission’s report to the Mayor is OUR report and not the Mayor’s. And it is our report whether he likes it or not,” Rev. Robinson told the Daily Worker. Then the Daily Worker obtained a copy of the report and started publishing chapters on July 2. On July 18, the New York Amsterdam News obtained and published the entire report other than the foreword and letter to the mayor that accompanied it. While the New York Age claimed the mayor had given its competitor the document, that seems unlikely given that the text published by both newspapers was not the version submitted to him, but Frazier’s unedited text. The New York Amsterdam News certainly did not credit the mayor as the source. “The Amsterdam News is happy it could avail itself of the opportunity to present to the public for the first time the complete report of the MCCH,” the paper editorialized. “Our duty appeared more patent because Mayor La Guardia has kept it hidden for months.” It also played up that the recommendations it published were “considered too hot, too caustic, too critical, too unfavorable by the Mayor,” and had been changed in the final version. Given that it was Frazier’s text that was supplied to the newspaper, it would not have come from an MCCH member who had pushed for the changes in the submitted version. Eunice Carter might have been the source. She had spoken up for submitting Frazier’s report unedited and in favor of its immediate release during the MCCH meeting on February 14 and would have had a copy.
  
  Introducing the report, the New York Amsterdam News published a story that summarized the discussion of the beginnings of the disorder while only identifying the topics of the other chapters, an attention to the events lacking in the white press. At the same time, it presented the report as nothing new, as “tell[ing] again of the combination of circumstances which made people to believe the young Negro boy had been beaten to death, and of how the police, first inefficiently, and next, ruthlessly, tried to meet the excitement of the people.” Both Frazier's assessments of the Communists' lack of responsibility for the disorder and their role in preventing it becoming a race riot were quoted in the story. Although the latter claim was new, and highlighted by a sub-heading “Communist Angle Touched,” the story offered no comment about it.
  
  Publication in the New York Amsterdam News was not the official release that MCCH members sought. Not only was the report not the version they had submitted to the mayor, other newspapers did not publish stories about the content of the report and no copies were available to those who did not get editions of the New York Amsterdam News. “No newspapers will give the same publicity to something reprinted from another paper as they would to a story given the papers generally and at the same time,” the New York Age complained, effectively describing its own response. The effect, the New York Age editorial went on, was “to bury the report.” By La Guardia's account, the press response played out in exactly that way over the next three months. Journalists from several publications read the report but “none have seen fit to print anything about it” because all the news in it had been covered by the newspapers that had published it.
  
  Alain Locke’s article, “Dark Weather-Vane,” published in the Survey Graphic in August 1936, did examine the report. Locked endorsed its account of the causes of the disorder, writing, “The careful report of the Commission on this occurrence correctly places the blame far beyond the immediate precipitating incidents.” More pointedly than in his memo to La Guardia, Locke criticized Valentine for continuing to assert that Communists caused the disorder. "There are those even in official circles who insist upon a more direct connection between Harlem’s restless temper and racial propaganda. To do so seriously misconstrues the situation by inverting the real cause and effect. Discrimination and injustice are the causes, not radicalism." Suggestions from Arthur Garfield Hays, who had been sent a draft of the article, had tightened the alignment of the article and the report. Where Locke had described the "immediate causes" of the disorder simply as "trivial," Hays suggested he add the "coincidental and unfortunate" events that the narratives in both the subcommittee report and Frazier's report presented as giving greater significance to the "trivial" apprehension of Lino Rivera: the appearances of the ambulance and the hearse. Locke revised the article to include that "by tragic coincidence an ambulance called to treat one of the Kress employees, whose hand the boy had bitten, seemed to confirm the rumor and a hearse left temporarily outside its garage in an alley at the rear of the store to corroborate this." Hays also suggested the addition of a "striking phrase" that the MCCH had used in regard to the killing of Lloyd Hobbs. Locke duly added the phrase: "As the report aptly says, 'A policeman who kills is prosecutor, judge and executioner.'" If Locke had been given a copy of the MCCH report, he would have realized that it did not actually contain that statement; it had appeared only in the report of the Subcommittee on Crime. Locke made no changes in response to Hays questioning how the article presented participation in the disorder. A reference to how as the result of Rivera's apprehension "a community of 200,000 was suddenly in the throes of serious riots through the night" wrongly gave the impression that "the whole community was engaged in rioting," Hays contended, when in fact the MCCH "concluded that 3 to 5 thousand was a liberal estimate." That more limited participation led the MCCH to often refer to "the incidents of that night as a disturbance rather than a riot," according to Hays. If Locke did not want to go as far as Hays in diminishing the violence of the disorder, which he described as "actual loss of life, many injures to police and citizens, destruction of property, and a serious aftermath of public grievance and anger," he did include other features of the MCCH's characterization of the events. In doing so, he drew on the Subcommittee Report as well as the MCCH report. After presenting the catalog of conclusions that opened the preliminary report, including that the events "were not a race riot in the sense of physical conflict between white and colored groups," he quoted Frazier's summation from the final report: "Its distinguishing feature was an attack upon property rather than persons." Rather than clearly endorsing that picture, in the opening of the article Locke offered a catalog of possible interpretations, noting that the events had been "variously diagnosed as a depression spasm, a Ghetto mutiny, a radical plot and dress rehearsal of proletarian revolution," before moving on to what concerned him, what the "revealing flash of lightning" showed: "the actual predicament of the mass life in Harlem." In glossing over the events in that way, he prefigured how historians would approach the disorder.
  
  By September, two months after the meeting with the mayor, Oscar Villard's patience had run out. He and Hays called for a meeting of the MCCH “to decide once and for all whether it will issue its report now, or wait for the Mayor to release it when it is no longer of any value.” The meeting, of which there was no record, evidently decided to give La Guardia an ultimatum by telegram. If he did not release it within ten days, Villard wrote, they would release it themselves. Villard was out of touch with what had happened, the mayor responded; the report had been available to the press for ten weeks. After expressing his astonishment at that news to La Guardia, Villard promptly notified the New York Herald Tribune, New York Times, New York Sun, and New York World-Telegram that the report had been “released.” Notwithstanding La Guardia’s claim, New York Herald Tribune journalists appeared unaware until then that the report was available. However, when one called at the mayor's office to get a copy, there were none. La Guardia, clearly concerned to avoid again being accused of suppressing the report, scrambled to send a copy, together with the city commissioners’ responses, to the paper. The New York Herald Tribune published only the responses. Other newspapers must have also been sent that material at the same time, as similar stories appeared in the New York Post, New York American, Home News, and New York Amsterdam News. The New York Post was again alone in publishing a less credulous view of the city’s response, which it headlined "City Clears Itself." Charles Roberts sent an angry complaint to the mayor that the responses had been released without the report. Walter White of the NAACP initially shared that anger until Hubert Delany told him that New York Herald Tribune and New York Times had a copy of the report as well and had chosen not to include it (the New York Times also did not publish a story about the commissioner's responses). Valentine’s report received the least attention in the coverage of the commissioners' responses. The New York Herald Tribune and Home News quoted only the statements that the report was in error and that only the lawless resented police, and the New York American only mentioned his denial of any resentment (while the New York Amsterdam News story did not mention Valentine). None of the stories took up Valentine’s assertion that that Communists had caused the disorder.
  
  As late as December, Eunice Carter was telling Morris Ernst that Mayor La Guardia was planning a meeting with the MCCH to discuss the report and to formally disband the group. The meeting never happened. Nor did the NAACP publish the report, as Carter suggested to Ernst they were planning to do. She might have misunderstood the organization's efforts to obtain copies of the report as an intention to publish it. In fact, the NAACP sought copies to give to individuals and organizations approaching it having struggled to find one. Arthur Garfield Hays also fielded similar requests, several times lending the copy in which he had marked sections for exclusion, the only one he had (given that this copy was not in his papers, one of those correspondents may have failed to return it). Frazier did submit proposals to publish the report to several presses. Although he pitched it as akin to the influential report on Chicago riot of 1919, he found no interest. It would not be until 1969 that the full report was published. That text was a transcription of the version that appeared in the New York Amsterdam News, establishing Frazier’s report, not the MCCH report as the version of record for most historians. Over time, writers and scholars relying on the report would follow Frazier and the MCCH members in marginalizing and obscuring the events of the disorder and diminishing its violence.
• 1 2023-07-09T00:33:29+00:00 The MCCH and the subcommittee report 20 plain 2024-02-02T22:06:57+00:00 Villard sent his draft report to Hays on May 27, the day before the MCCH was scheduled to meet. He proposed that they “read the report to the whole committee and discuss any suggestions or criticisms.” Only six other MCCH members joined them at that meeting, only Ernst of the four other white members and five of the seven Black members, Roberts, Carter, Toney, Robinson, and Cullen. All five members of the subcommittee on crime were among those in attendance. Villard read the report, “a few necessary corrections” were made, and then Ernst moved that the MCCH adopt the report and arrange to submit it to the mayor. Hays’ copy of Villard’s report is marked up with several corrections and additions. They are likely a combination of changes made by Hays and those made at the MCCH meeting.
  
  The MCCH made several changes to reduce the violence in the report’s portrayal of the events of the disorder. “Riot” was replaced with “disturbance” in the opening sentence and the account of police fetching Rivera from his bed to show he was unharmed. Hays later explained that due to the small proportion of the community involved in the disorder, the MCCH “often referred to the incidents of that night as a 'disturbance' rather than a 'riot.'” The violence described in the report was further reduced by corrections to claims not supported by the information gathered by the MCCH. The reference to five deaths in the preface to the findings that opened the report was corrected to several deaths. Opting to refer less precisely to several deaths reflected the uncertainty surrounding two of the four deaths the MCCH had investigated, with no clear evidence of the circumstances in which August Miller and Andrew Lyons had died. There is no mention of a fifth death. A later reference to “five men who lost their lives were killed by police” was removed. The possibility that police were responsible for all the shootings during the disorder had been examined during the first public hearing, but they had been established as responsible only for killing Lloyd Hobbs and James Thompson. Also removed from the middle of a long quotation of Louise Thompson’s testimony to the first public hearing was a mention of a woman breaking an umbrella on the head of a police officer in the Kress store. None of the other testimony about events in the store had mentioned such an attack.
  
  At the same time as they downplayed the violence of the disorder as a whole, MCCH members heightened their criticism of the actions of the police and district attorney in the killing of Lloyd Hobbs. As well as additions highlighting how unlikely it was that Hobbs had time to enter the automobile store, loot it, and leave carrying items in his hands as the police described, a further denunciation was added: “A policeman who kills becomes at once prosecutor, judge, jury and executioner.” Criticism of the district attorney was made more pointed, with the reluctance to seek an indictment of Patrolman McInerney becoming a result of the “killer” being a police officer.
  
  One other set of cuts to the report changed its portrayal of participants in the disorder. The MCCH removed two descriptions of the Black population that employed racist stereotypes that implied a degree of responsibility for the disorder. Villard had allowed, in introducing the section on police conduct, that “the excitable nature of the people with whom the police were called upon to deal” would have contributed to the actions of police during the disorder. In the final sentence he had also attributed the danger radical propaganda posed to “public order” in Harlem not only to the economic and social conditions but also to “a people peculiarly subject to emotional appeals.” The description of participants as coming from the criminal class, which Villard had used in place of Hays description of them as hoodlums, was changed to hoodlums. Presenting participants as troublemakers rather than criminals reduced the threat posed by the disorder, in a parallel with the change from riot to disturbance.
  
  Hays sent Villard a “clean copy” of the report on May 29, which included an additional section he wrote addressed to the mayor and police commissioner urging them to take the opportunity to change the system and psychology of police. After Villard returned it with “a few typographical and stylistic changes on June 1, Hays responded suggesting adding a final sentence highlighting the recommendations to create community oversight of the police and change police behavior could be adopted even in the midst of a depression as they required no extra spending, a version of which appeared in the final report. Both those additions were made without reference to the other MCCH members.
  
  At the next meeting of the MCCH, on June 4, Hays reported that the edited report was ready to be signed by MCCH members, after which he would deliver it to the Mayor’s office. Ten MCCH members signed the report. The signatures of A. Philip Randolph and William Schieffelin were missing because they were out of town, Hays wrote in the letter accompanying the submitted report. Father McCann had “refused to sign the Report, apparently not approving thereof.” Although the priest had not been at the meeting on May 28 that had read the report, he was present the next week when it was ready for signatures but apparently had not voiced his objections at that time. However, when the subcommittee report was released, McCann would publicly challenge the MCCH account of the events of the disorder and the role of police in the violence.